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Abstract
The present paper reports results from the first study designed to ex-
amine the neuronal responses to income inequality in situations in which
individuals have made different contributions in terms of work effort. We
conducted an experiment that included a prescanning phase in which the
participants earned money by working, and a neuronal scanning phase in
which we examined how the brain responded when the participants evalu-
ated different distributions of their earnings. We provide causal evidence
of the relative contribution of work effort being crucial for understanding
the hemodynamic response in the brain. We found a significant hemody-
namic response in the striatum to deviations from the distribution of income
that was proportional to work effort, but found no effect of deviations from
the equal distribution of income. We also observed a striking correlation
between the hemodynamic response in the striatum and the self-reported
evaluation of the income distributions. Our results provide the first set of
neuronal evidence for equity theory and suggest that people distinguish be-
tween fair and unfair inequalities.
Keywords: fairness; inequality; striatum; equity theory
JEL Code: D63
The study of inequality, its sources and consequences, has been a core issue in
all of the social sciences and in the philosophical literature on distributive justice.
Important normative theories have argued that income inequalities are inherently
unfair (Rawls, 1971), whereas other theories, in particular libertarianism and lib-
eral egalitarian theories of justice (Nozick, 1974; Dworkin, 1981; Arneson, 1989;
Roemer, 1998), argue that income inequalities can be fair if they reflect morally
relevant differences. This theoretical debate is mirrored in the political debate on
tax, welfare, and health policies, where a key question is whether some inequal-
ities should be accepted as fair. In particular, a core issue in the design of tax
and welfare policies is how to handle income inequalities caused by differences
in work effort, productivity or risk-taking. Similar issues arise in the discussion
of how to handle inequalities in health due to life style choices. Moreover, in
the private sector, heated debates about the fairness of workplace inequalities in
earnings are common (Card et al., 2012).
Preferences for income distribution have been extensively studied in both con-
trolled economic experiments and surveys, and the nature of such preferences has
become one of the major questions in behavioral research in social psychology and
economics. Important papers in behavioral economics have studied how people
respond to different income distributions and have documented, using economic
experiments, that people dislike unequal outcomes and are willing to make a trade-
off between their own income and equality Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000); Engelmann and Strobel (2004). An extensive and influential
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literature on equity theory in social psychology has studied how perceptions of
fairness in social situations depend on the relationship between input and output.
The main result reported in this literature is that people find it fair that the in-
come (output) of a person is in proportion to the work effort (input), and that they
dislike deviations from a proportional distribution (Adams, 1965; Walster et al.,
1973; Leventhal, 1980). In line with equity theory, more recent papers in behav-
ioral economics, studying distributive behavior in situations in which people have
earned the money being distributed, have found that the majority of people accept
income inequalities as fair if the inequalities correspond to differences in contri-
butions (Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010, 2013; Frohlich et al., 2004; Konow, 2000).
Thus, there is evidence suggesting that people are averse both to deviations from
an equal income distribution and to deviations from an income distribution in pro-
portion to work effort.
An important neuroeconomic study by Tricomi et al. (Tricomi et al., 2010)
provided suggestive neuronal evidence of inequality aversion. There is, however,
no direct neural evidence of how the brain evaluates an income distribution in sit-
uations in which people have made different contributions in terms of work effort.
The present paper reports from the first neuroimaging study designed to examine
how the brain responds to the distribution of income in such situations. As such, it
is also the first study to examine the neuronal basis for equity theory. We focus on
two main questions. First, we examine whether a person’s contribution in terms
of work effort affects the way in which the brain’s reward system responds to dif-
ferent income distributions. Addressing this question also allows us to examine
how the brain’s reward system responds to deviations from a proportional income
distribution, and to compare this response with the response to deviations from an
equal income distribution and to an increase in own income. Second, we study
how the hemodynamic response in the brain to distributions of earned income
correlates with the self-reported evaluations of the same income distributions.
To address these questions, we designed an experiment with two phases: a
prescanning phase, in which the participants earned money by working on a real-
effort task, and a scanning phase, in which we used functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) to examine how different regions of the brain responded when the
participants evaluated different distributions of their earnings. The participants
were 47 male students from the Norwegian School of Economics.
In the prescanning phase of the experiment, each participant was randomly as-
signed to work on repetitive office work, stuffing envelopes, and entering records
into a database, for a specific length of time. Roughly half of the participants
(23 subjects) were randomly assigned to work for 60 min, whereas the remaining
participants were randomly assigned to work for either 30 or 90 min (12 subjects
in each group). All participants were told that their earnings would be based on
an hourly wage of 500 NOK (approximately 85 USD), but that a random process
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could interfere so that their final payment would not necessarily be the same as
their earnings.
In the scanning phase, the participants where matched with another participant
and each pair worked for 120 min in total and the sum of their earnings was 1000
NOK. We had three conditions that differed only with respect to how much the
participant in the scanner had contributed in terms of work effort. In the 30:90
condition, the participant in the scanner had worked for 30 min and was matched
with someone who had worked 90 min. Participants in the 60:60 condition had
worked for 60 min and was matched with someone who had also worked for 60
min, and the participant in 90:30 condition had worked 90 min and was matched
with someone who had worked 30 min. For the participant in the scanner, the
share of total work effort in the three conditions was thus either 25%, 50% or
75% depending on the condition.
While inside the MR-scanner, the participants rated a sequence of 51 possible
distributions of the total earnings on a scale that ranged from very bad (-5) to
very good (+5). How much each participant in the pair had contributed in terms
of work effort and earnings was common knowledge. Interspersed with the rating
trials were 30 control trials. In the control trials, no income distribution was shown
and the task of the participants was only to tick off a specific number on the rating
scale. The control trials allowed us to distinguish between the neural response
that resulted from motor and visual stimulation when ticking off a number on the
rating scale and the neural response that resulted from the subjective evaluation of
an income distribution.
A key feature of the design was that participants who disliked deviations from
a proportional income distribution would respond differently to an increase in own
income depending on which condition they were in. For such participants, an in-
crease in own income beyond 250 NOK would have two counteracting effects in
the 30:90 condition: they would like getting more money for themselves, but they
would dislike the increase in the deviation from a proportional income distribu-
tion. For a participant in the 90:30 condition, however, an increase in their own
income would result in both more money for themselves and a reduction in the
deviation from a proportional income distribution, as long as their own income
was below 750 NOK. We would therefore predict that participants in the 90:30
condition valued an increase in own income more than did participants in the
30:90 condition for own income ranging between 250 and 750 NOK (Prediction
1). Similarly, we would predict that participants in the 60:60 condition valued an
increase in own income more than did those in the 30:90 condition in the interval
between 250 and 500 NOK (Prediction 2), and that they valued an increase in own
income less than did those in the 90:30 condition in the interval between 500 and
750 NOK (Prediction 3).
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1 Results
Figure 1 shows the average subjective rating of the income distributions as a func-
tion of own income for the participants in the three conditions. The participants in
the three conditions had earnings of 250, 500 and 750 NOK respectively, as indi-
cated in the figure. We observe that the way in which participants evaluate a given
income distribution differ between the conditions. We also note that the subjective
ratings flatten out and, strikingly, even tend to drop, when the participant received
a share of total income that was much larger than their earnings. The subjective
ratings also show that the participants evaluated income inequalities very differ-
ently in the three conditions. For example, the income inequality (250 NOK, 750
NOK) was given a neutral rating by the participants who had worked for 30 min
(where the inequality corresponded to differences in earnings); in contrast, it was
given a highly negative rating by the participants who had worked for 60 or 90
min (where the inequality did not correspond to differences in earnings).
In the study of the neuronal underpinnings of the behavioral results, we fo-
cus on the response in the striatum. The striatum is a key part of the emotional
circuitry of the brain and plays an important role in motivating and regulating be-
havior (Kompus et al., 2012). Furthermore, the striatum has been associated with
social preferences and moral choices in many earlier studies (Bartels and Zeki,
2000; Bault et al., 2011; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Hsu et al., 2008; Fliessbach et al.,
2007; Lane et al., 1997; Moll et al., 2006; Sanfey, 2007; Tabibnia et al., 2008; Tri-
comi et al., 2010). In the striatum we identify the left and the right caudate nucleus
as regions of interest because experimental trials produced significantly different
blood- oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) response compared with control trials in
these two regions. Both regions are indicated in Figure 2A. For the two striatal
regions we find a significant negative correlation between the subjective ratings
and the BOLD response (p< 0.01 for both regions), which means that decreased
blood activation in these regions is associated with increased subjective valuation.
In Table 1, we test whether the BOLD response in the two striatal regions and
the subjective rating are in line with our three predictions. Columns 1-3 report the
results from regressions testing the prediction that participants who worked for 90
min have a stronger response to an increase in own income than do participants
who worked 30 min (Prediction 1). We find that this indeed was the case: the
marginal effect of own income on both the BOLD response and the subjective
rating was smaller for those participants who worked for 30 min than it was for
those who worked for 90 min in the relevant interval of own income. The differ-
ence between the two conditions is statistically significant for the subjective rating
(p= 0.016) and for the left caudate nucleus (p= 0.043), but not for the right cau-
date nucleus (p= 0.141). The difference in the marginal effects of own income is
illustrated in Figure 2B. The results reported in columns 4-6 and columns 7-9 also
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provide support for our two additional predictions. In the relevant intervals of own
income, we find that the response to an increase in own income for participants
who worked for 60 min is stronger than for those who worked for 30 min, which
is in line with Prediction 2 (subjective rating, p = 0.017; left caudate nucleus,
p= 0.075; and right caudate nucleus, p= 0.150), and weaker than for those who
had worked 90 min, which is in line with Prediction 3 (subjective rating, p< 0.01;
left caudate nucleus, p = 0.049; and right caudate nucleus, p = 0.251). Our re-
sults thus provide strong causal evidence of the effect of relative work effort on
both the BOLD response in the striatum and the subjective evaluations. The dif-
ferences between the three conditions furthermore provide suggestive evidence
of the participants being concerned with deviations from a proportional income
distribution.
In Table 2 we report the results from regressions in which we directly examine
how the participants respond to deviations from a proportional income distribu-
tion. We find that deviation from proportionality is significantly correlated with
both the subjective rating (p < 0.01) and the BOLD response in the two striatal
regions (p < 0.01 for the left caudate nucleus, and p = 0.045 for the right cau-
date nucleus). We interpret this result as providing the first set of evidence of a
neuronal basis for the acceptance of income inequalities that correspond to differ-
ences in work effort. The regressions reported in Table 2 also estimate the effect
of deviations from equality. We observe that deviations from equality, in contrast
with deviations from proportionality, has no significant effect on the subjective
rating or the BOLD response in the two striatal regions.
Using the estimates in Table 2, we compare the effect of a reduction in the
deviation from proportionality with the effect of an increase in own income. Our
estimates imply that a reduction in the deviation from proportionality of 10 per-
centage points results in the same BOLD response as an increase in own income
of 73 NOK in the left caudate nucleus and the same BOLD response as an increase
in own income of 45 NOK in the right caudate nucleus. For the subjective rating,
we find that a reduction in the deviation from proportionality by 10 percentage
points has the same effect as an increase in own income of 34 NOK.
In addition to the two regions in the striatum, we also identified several regions
in the prefrontal cortex where experimental trials produced significantly different
BOLD response from control trials. The analysis of the BOLD responses in these
regions, which is reported in the supplementary material, did not show a clear pat-
tern for how these regions respond to own income or to deviations from propor-
tionality. However, it is interesting to observe that deviations from proportionality
had a significant effect on the BOLD response in the left inferior frontal gyrus.
This result suggests that cognitive processes in the prefrontal cortex are involved
in the evaluation of fair and unfair inequalities Alma˚s et al. (2010).
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2 Discussion
The present study has examined how participants respond to different distributions
of a fixed sum of earned income between themselves and another participants. We
had three experimental conditions that differed only with respect to the work effort
of the participants. We found a strong effect of the conditions on the participants
BOLD response in the striatum to an increase in own income (and a corresponding
decrease in the income to the other participant). We also found strong evidence of
the participants being concerned with deviations from a proportional income dis-
tribution. In contrast, we did not find evidence of participants disliking deviations
from an equal income distribution. We interpret this as showing that concerns for
outcome equality is of relatively little importance in situations in which income
has been earned through work effort. This results is particularly striking since our
sample is from a Scandinavian country that is among the most egalitarian coun-
tries in the world.
The fact that we did not find any significant BOLD activation in the striatum
in response to deviations from equality also sheds light on the neuronal evidence
of inequality aversion that was reported in the paper by Tricomi et al. (2010). In
their experiment, there was no difference in the participants’ contributions and, as
a result, any deviation from an equal distribution would also be a deviation from
a distribution in proportion to contributions. Thus, their finding is consistent with
our results, because the neuronal response obtained using their design may well
reflect a concern for a proportional distribution of income.
These results can be seen as adding to the literature on the role of social com-
parisons in the evaluation of income to self. Bault et al. (2011) showed that the
striatal response to an economic gain depends on whether the gain was smaller
or larger than the gain of a counterpart. Our results can be interpreted as show-
ing that such social comparisons also take into account the relative contribution
of the counterpart. Our results are also complementary to the results reported by
Vostroknutov et al. (2012), who find that the response in the prefrontal cortex to
an income inequality is sensitive to whether the inequality was a result of luck or
skill.
Our paper has documented a striking similarity between the effect of our con-
ditions on the subjective ratings and on the BOLD response in the striatum. The
subjective ratings and the BOLD response also provided similar pictures of the
trade-off between own income and deviations from proportionality. We interpret
this as showing that attitudes to income distribution have a neuronal basis in the
brain’s reward system.
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A materials
A.1 Participants
Forty-seven neurologically and psychiatrically healthy male individuals took part
in this study.1 The mean age was 24.8 years (range, 20–33 years) and six par-
ticipants were left-handed. Prior to fMRI measurement, participants gave writ-
ten informed consent. The study was performed according to the Declaration of
Helsinki.
When participants arrived for the experiment, they were given a detailed gen-
eral information sheet regarding the manner in which the experiment would pro-
ceed. The sessions were held over three weekends in the spring of 2011 at Hauke-
land University Hospital, and participants were given a participation and trans-
portation allowance (450 NOK in total), in addition to the payment from the ex-
periment.
Apart from an initial check of signed consent forms, all identification of be-
havior and payment in the experiment was based on a random number that each
participant drew from a bowl when they arrived for the experiment.
A.2 Behavioral tasks
The experiment consisted of two phases: a prescanning phase, in which the par-
ticipants earned income by working on a real-effort task, and a scanning phase,
in which we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine how
different regions of the brain responded when the participants evaluated different
distributions of their earnings. In the prescanning phase of the experiment, each
participant was randomly assigned to work either 30, 60, or 90 min performing
repetitive office work, stuffing envelopes, and entering records into a database.
They were told that their earnings would be based on a hourly wage of 500 NOK
(approximately 85 USD), but that a random process could interfere so that their
payment from the experiment would not necessarily be the same as their earnings.
In the scanning phase, the participants were matched with a participant who
had worked either the same length of time, or with a participant who had worked a
different length of time. The total working time for a pair was always 120 min, the
total earnings of the pair was always 1000 NOK, and the amount earned by each
participant was common knowledge. Each participant was then asked to evaluate
a sequence of possible distributions of the total earnings between the two of them
on a scale from very bad (-5) to very good (+5). See Figure S1 in the supplemen-
tary material for screenshots. In total they made 51 such evaluations. Since the
1Forty-eight students were recruited, but one did not show up.
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participants evaluated ex post distributions of the earned income, there were no
incentive effects of the different distributions; therefore, efficiency considerations
did not affect the evaluations. Interspersed with the rating trials were 30 control
trials. In the control trials, no income distribution was shown and the task of the
participants was only to tick off a specific number on the rating scale.
The number of seconds at each stage is indicated in the screenshots in the sup-
plementary material for a sequence of one experimental trial and one control trial
(Figure S1): 1 s for fixation, 2 s for showing the income distribution, 4 s for evalu-
ating the income distribution on the rating scale (or ticking off a number in case of
the control trials), and an interval between trials of varying length (randomly dis-
tributed between 1 and 7 s) to increase temporal resolution. This averaged 11 s per
trial (range, 8 - 14 s). Before entering the scanner, the screenshots were explained
to the participants and they were trained on using the handgrip that controlled the
interface. The hand that was used to hold the grip for the experimental interface
was randomly allocated.
A.3 Image Acquisition
Data acquisition was performed on a 3T GE Signa Excite scanner. Thirty slices (3
mm thickness, 2.3×2.3×2.3 mm voxel size, 0.3 mm interslice gap) were obtained
in an interleaved fashion parallel to the anterior commissure – posterior commis-
sure (AC-PC) line, using a single-shot gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) se-
quence (repetition time, 2000 ms; echo time, 30 ms; bandwidth, 116 kHz; flip an-
gle, 90◦; 96×96 pixel matrix; field of view 220 mm). Prior to functional scanning,
a high-resolution anatomical brain image was recorded from each participant.
A.4 Image Preprocessing
All image processing and statistical analyses were performed using the statistical
parametric mapping software SPM8. First, all images were realigned to the first
image in the time-series to correct for head movement, and movement related im-
age distortions were corrected by applying an unwarping procedure. Second, the
images were normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) reference
space. The transformation into the MNI space was estimated by warping an av-
eraged image, which was created during the realignment procedure, into the MNI
space. Subsequently this transformation was applied to each image of the time se-
ries. Normalized data were resliced to a cubic voxel size of 3 mm3 and smoothed
with a Gaussian kernel (8 mm FWHM).
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A.5 Statistical Parametric Mapping
The statistical analysis was based on the general linear model framework, im-
plemented in SPM. First, a design matrix was specified, in which the onset and
duration of the experimental and control trial were specified. In addition, for
each condition, the trial-by-trial responses were included as an additional regres-
sor. The model was fitted to the data by applying a high-pass filter with a cutoff
frequency of 128 s. Thereafter, contrasts between the parameter estimates were
defined. Group analyses were estimated by combining these individual contrasts
in one-sample t-tests. First, a one-sample t-test was used for comparing the ex-
perimental with the control condition. This analysis was performed by applying a
family-wise-error (FWE) corrected statistical threshold of p(FWE)< 0.05 and a
threshold of at least 20 voxels per cluster.
A.6 Single-trial Data
To study the neuronal responses to different types of inequality in the regions
of interest, we estimated individual hemodynamic response functions (HRFs) us-
ing the method reported in Eichele et al. (2008). For each participant and region
of interest (ROI) separately, the empirical event-related hemodynamic responses
(HRs) were deconvolved by forming the convolution matrix of all trial onsets with
an assumed kernel length of 20 s, and multiplying the pseudoinverse of this matrix
with the filtered and unit variance normalized ROI time course. Single-trial am-
plitudes were recovered by fitting a design matrix containing separate predictors
for each trial onset, convolved with the estimated HR onto the ROI time course.
The single trial weights (scaling coefficients (β ), were estimated using multiple
linear regression.
There was a significant negative correlation between the subjective ratings and
the BOLD response in the two striatal regions (p< 0.01 for both regions). In the
analysis, the sign of the single-trial data was normalized such that the marginal
BOLD response to own income in the striatal regions coincided with that of the
subjective ratings.
B Analysis of Single-trial Data
The single trial data were analyzed using Stata, version 13.1, for each region sep-
arately.
The estimates of condition contrasts in subjective rating and BOLD response
presented in Table 1 are based on the following regression:
yit = γi+β1xit+β2(Ti× xit)+ εit , (1)
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where i index individuals, Ti is a dummy for which condition the individual was
in, and t index trials. All regressions are estimated on the ranges of own income
(xit) relevant to the hypotheses that is tested. BOLD responses are normalized to
individual unit variance, and the γis are fixed effects for individuals.
In Table 2 we report an OLS regression of the subjective rating and the BOLD
response in the left and right caudate nucleus on own income, deviation from
proportionality and deviation from equality. The regression is given by
yit = γi+β1xit+β2
|xit−mi|
max |xit−mi| +β3
|xit−500|
500
+ εit , (2)
where mi is the participants earnings, |xit −mi| is the deviation from a propor-
tional income distribution, and |xit − 500| is the deviation from an equal income
distribution.
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Figure 1: Subjective ratings in the scanner
The graphs show the mean and standard error of the subjective rating in the scan-
ner for each of the 51 possible distributions of income. The subjective rating in
the three graphs corresponds to the participants who worked for 30, 60, and 90
min, and was matched with participants who worked for 90, 60, and 30 min re-
spectively. The participants’ earnings in each condition are indicated by a vertical
line.
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Figure 2: Regions of interest
Panel A indicates the two regions in the striatum, the left and right caudate nu-
cleus, in which experimental trials produced significantly different blood-oxygen-
level-dependent (BOLD) responses from control trials. Other displayed areas are
regions that were located outside the striatum in which we also found difference
between experimental and control trials, that were significant at a family wise
error (FWE)-corrected threshold of p(FWE) < 0.05, and had at least 10 voxels
per cluster. A complete list of these regions is reported and analyzed in the sup-
plementary material. Panel B reports the marginal effect of own income on the
subjective rating and the BOLD response in the left and right caudate nucleus for
participants in the 30:90 condition and the 90:30 condition in the interval between
250 and 750 NOK.
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Table 2: Effects of deviation from proportionality
BOLD
Subjective Caudate nucleus
ratings left right
Own income(in 100s NOK) 1.119∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.212) (0.194)
Deviation from proportionality -3.777∗∗∗ -4.708∗∗∗ -2.833∗∗
(1.161) (1.611) (1.373)
Deviation from equality 0.372 1.550 -0.468
(0.970) (1.698) (1.594)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports OLS regressions of the subjective rating and the BOLD-
response in the left and right caudate nucleus on own income, deviation from
proportionality and deviation from equality. Deviation from proportionality and
deviation from equality are measured relative to the maximum deviation possible.
BOLD outcomes are measured in units of 1/10 standard deviation.
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C Supplementary material: The experiment
Figure S1 shows the in-scanner screenshots.2
D Supplementary material: Results for all 20 re-
gions
We identified 18 regions in addition to the two regions in the striatum, where treat-
ment trials produced significantly different BOLD response from control trials. In
Table S1–S4 we report all the results that are reported in the main paper for the
full set of 20 regions, together with MNI coordinates.
E Supplementary material: Robustness of the main
results
In Table S5 we report robustness of the specification of the main model in the
paper (Table 2).
The first three columns of Table S5 report a variation of Table 2 in the main
paper where we use absolute deviations instead of the “relative to max deviation”
formulation used in the main paper:
yit = γi+β1xit+β2|xit−mi|+β3|xit−500|+ εit , (S3)
We observe qualitatively the same pattern as in the paper.
The last two columns of Table S5 report on a variant of the Table 2 in the the
main paper in which we include fixed effects for each possible subjective tick-off,
(identified by including the control trials) and an indicator for the current trial
being a control trial (in which all monetary outcomes are zero):
yit = γi+Cit+Rr(it)+β1xit+β2
|xit−mi|
max |xit−mi| +β3
|xit−500|
500
+ εit , (S4)
in which Rr(it) is a dummy indicator for the subjective rating (or forced tick-off) r
by individual i in trial t. Again we observe much the same (only slightly attenu-
ated) results as reported in the main paper.
2Figures and tables at the end of this document.
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F Supplementarymaterial: Analysis of the post-scanner
dictator game
A concern when conducting distributive games in a scanner is there might be
strong experimenter demand effects since participants might feel particularly scru-
tinized. The results from the post-scanner dictator game allow us to address this
concern. Figure S2 shows the share of the endowment given to the other partic-
ipant in the post-scanner dictator game. The mean share given to others is 0.28
(standard error 0.03), and 17 out 47 participants gave nothing to the other partic-
ipant. This result is similar to the result from earlier experiments with students,
which suggests that the the present design did not invoke a strong experimenter
demand effect (Engel, 2011).
Data from the post-scanner dictator game also allow us to examine whether
the information collected in the scanner is predictive of behavior in a distributive
situation outside the scanner. In Table S6 we observe that is the case: the amount
given in the dictator game is significantly correlated with both subjective ratings
and BOLD measures in the striatum.
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(a) Fixation, 1s. (b) Report on income, 2s. (c) Evaluation of income, 4s.
(d) Waiting, random interval. (e) Fixation, 1s. (f) Control for income report, 2s.
(g) Control for evaluation, 4s. (h) Waiting, random interval.
Figure S1: The trials in the scanner
In the scanner, participants were exposed to a total of 51 evaluation trials with different income distributions and 30
controls, in a randomized sequence. The panels above show a sub-sequence of one evaluation trial and one control
trial. In both (c) and (g) the participant used buttons on a grip to tick of his evaluation or the control number. The
grip had two buttons, one to press (and keep depressed) to move left, and one to move right. The interface was
programmed using E-Prime version 2.
Translations: (b): “You worked: 30 min”, “The other worked: 90 min”. “You earn: 120 NOK”, “The other earns:
880 kr”. (c, added): “How do you like this outcome?”, “Very badly—Very well”. (f): Same text as (b), amounts
X’d out. (g, bottom): “Please tick off 2 on the scale below:”.
4
Figure S1: The trials in he scanner
In the scanner, participants were exposed to a total of 51 evaluation trials with
different income distributions and 30 contr ls, in a randomized sequence. Th
panels above show a sub-sequence of one evaluation trial and one control trial. In
both (c) and (g) the participant used buttons on a grip to tick of his evaluation or
the c ntrol nu ber. The grip had two buttons, one to press (and keep depressed)
to move left, and one to move right. The interface was programmed using E-Prime
version 2.
Translations: (b): “You worked: 30 min”, “The other worked: 90 min”. “You
earn: 120 NOK”, “The other earns: 880 kr”. (c, added): “How do you like this
outcome?”, “Very badly—Very well”. (f): Same text as (b), amounts X’d out. (g,
bottom): “Please tick off 2 on the scale below:”.
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Figure S2: Share given in post-scanner dictator game
Share given is the share of the endowment (200 NOK) given to the other partici-
pant in the dictator game, where the dictator had to choose between 11 alternative
shares: 0,0.1,0.2, . . . ,1. In a pair, one participant was randomly drawn to deter-
mine outcome for both.
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         ID-code: 
Decision 2 
We now want you to make a decision in a real distributive situation. In this case, you are also 
matched with another participant, but this participant is different from the one you were 
matched with in the scanner. This participant has worked the same amount of time as you. 
Both of you have each been allocated 100 NOK in addition to what you earned from your 
work. Together, the two of you have earned 200 NOK and you have to decide you the 200 
NOK between yourself and the other participant. Note that this is an anonymous decision so 
that we will not know which decision you make.  
Below is a list of eleven alternative distributions of the total amount, 200 NOK. Please 
indicate your decision by making a cross in the box beside the alternative you prefer. 
 
 To you 
in NOK  
To the 
other 
in NOK 
Your decision (indicate 
your decision with a 
cross) 
1 200 0  
2 180 20  
3 160 40  
4 140 60  
5 120 80  
6 100 100  
7 80 120  
8 60 140  
9 40 160  
10 20 180  
11 0 200  
 
When you have made your decision, you put the sheet in the envelope and the envelope in 
the box. After the experiment, a computer will randomly select either your proposal or the 
proposal of the participant in this situation, and both of you will paid accordingly from this 
situation.  
Figure S3: Form used for real choice post-scanning
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Table S6: Correlates of share given
Variable correlated with share given p-value
Subjective rating 0.03
BOLD: Right caudate nucleus 0.02
BOLD: Left caudate nucleus 0.04
Note: Reported are p-values for tests that the correlation between the variable
and the share given in the post-scanner dictator game is different from zero. The
BOLD measures are summarized at the individual level by the regression coeffi-
cient of the outcome and own income (at or above the fair level). The regressions
are run for one individual at a time, with the variance of outcome variables stan-
dardized.
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